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Abstract
The process by which new ideas, innovations, and behaviors spread through a large social network
can be thought of as a networked interaction game: Each agent obtains information from certain number
of agents in his friendship neighborhood, and adapts his idea or behavior to increase his benefit. In this
paper, we are interested in how opinions, about a certain topic, form in social networks. We model
opinions as continuous scalars ranging from 0 to 1 with 1 (0) representing extremely positive (negative)
opinion. Each agent has an initial opinion and incurs some cost depending on the opinions of his
neighbors, his initial opinion, and his stubbornness about his initial opinion. Agents iteratively update
their opinions based on their own initial opinions and observing the opinions of their neighbors. The
iterative update of an agent can be viewed as a myopic cost-minimization response (i.e., the so-called
best response) to the others’ actions. We study whether an equilibrium can emerge as a result of such
local interactions and how such equilibrium possibly depends on the network structure, initial opinions
of the agents, and the location of stubborn agents and the extent of their stubbornness. We also study
the convergence speed to such equilibrium and characterize the convergence time as a function of
aforementioned factors. We also discuss the implications of such results in a few well-known graphs
such as Erdos-Renyi random graphs and small-world graphs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Rapid expansion of online social networks, such as friendships and information networks,
in recent years has raised an interesting question: how do opinions form in a social network?
The opinion of each person is influenced by many factors such as his friends, news, political
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2views, area of professional activity, and etc. Understanding such interactions and predicting how
specific opinions spread throughout social networks has triggered vast research by economists,
sociologist, psychologies, physicists, etc.
We consider a social network consisting of n agents. We model the social network as a graph
G(V , E) where agents are the vertices and edges indicate pairs of agents that have interactions.
Agents have some private initial opinions and iteratively update their opinions based on their own
initial opinions and observing the opinions of their neighbors. We study whether an equilibrium
can emerge as a result of such local interactions and how such equilibrium possibly depends on
the graph structure and initial opinions of the agents. In the interaction model, we also incorporate
stubbornness of agents with respect to their initial opinions and investigate the dependency of
the equilibrium on such stubborn agents. Characterizing the convergence rate to the equilibrium
as a function of graph structure, location of stubborn agents and their levels of stubbornness is
another goal of the current paper.
A. Related Work
There has been an interesting line of research trying to explain emergence of new phenomenon,
such as spread of innovations and new technologies, based on local interactions among agents,
e.g., [8], [10], [11], [27]. Roughly speaking, a coordination game is played between the agents
in which adopting a common strategy has a higher payoff. Agents behave according to a
noisy version of the best-response dynamics. Introducing the noise eliminates the possibility
of multiple equilibria and drives the system to a particular equilibrium in which all agents take
the same action [10], [11], [27]. In particular, [11] studied the rate of convergence for two
scenarios of extreme interaction, namely, a complete graph and a ring graph, and showed that
the dynamics converges very slowly in the complete graph and very fast in the ring network.
Reference [27] studies the convergence time for general networks and establishes similar results
that show highly-connected non-local graphs exhibit slow convergence and poorly connected,
low dimensional graphs exhibit fast convergence.
There is a rich and still growing literature on social learning using a Bayesian perspective
where individuals observe the actions of others and update their beliefs iteratively about an
underlying state variable, e. g., [13], [14], [15]. There is also opinion dynamics based on non-
Bayesian models, e. g., those in [1], [2], [3], [4], [12], [16]. In particular, [16] investigates
3a model in which agents meet and adopt the average of their pre-meeting opinions and there
are also forceful agents that influence the opinions of others but may not change their opinions.
Under such a model, and assuming that even forceful agents update their opinions when meeting
some agents, [16] investigates convergence to the average of the initial opinions and characterizes
the amount of divergence from the average due to such forceful agents. As reported in [16],
it is significantly more difficult to analyze social networks with several forceful agents that
do not change their opinions and requires a different mathematical approach. Our model is
closely related to the non-Bayesian framework, this keeps the computations tractable and can
characterize the equilibrium in presence of agents that are biased towards their initial opinions
(the so-called partially stubborn agents in our paper) or do not change their opinions at all (the
so-called fully stubborn agents in our paper). The recent work [17] studies opinion dynamics
based on the so-called voter model where each agent holds a binary 0-1 opinion and at each
time a randomly chosen agent adopts the opinion of one of his neighbors, and there are also
stubborn agents that do not change their states. Under such model, [17] shows that the opinions
converge in distribution and characterizes the first and the second moments of this distribution.
In addition, our paper is also related to consensus problems in which the question of interest
is whether beliefs (some scalar numbers) held by different agents will converge to a common
value, e.g., [18], [19], [20], [21], [22].
B. Contributions
Our first set of results, Lemmas 1 and 2, are rather straightforward characterizations of
equilibrium and convergence time when there are no stubborn agents. These results are analogs
of well-known convergence results for the probability distribution over the states of a Markov
chain. In this case, our model reduces to a continuous coordination game and the (noisy) best-
response dynamics converge to a common opinion in which the impact of each agent is directly
proportional to his degree in the social network. The analysis of the convergence speed, in such
a continuous coordination game, reveals conclusions that are different from those in [11], [27]
in the context of a two-strategy coordination game. The convergence of best-response dynamics
in highly connected non-local graphs, like the complete graph, occurs at a faster speed than the
convergence in poorly connected local graphs like the ring graph.
Our second set of results are concerned with social networks in which some of the agents are
4fully/partially stubborn. In this case, the best-response dynamics at each agent converges to a
convex combination of the initial opinions of the stubborn agents (Lemma 3). The impact of each
stubborn agent on such an equilibrium is related to appropriately defined hitting probabilities
over a modified graph Gˆ(Vˆ , Eˆ) of the original social network G(V , E). We also give an interesting
electrical network interpretation of the equilibrium (Lemma 4). Since the exact characterization
of convergence time is difficult, we derive appropriate upper-bounds (Lemma 6, Lemma 7)
and a lower-bound (Lemma 8) on the convergence time that depend on the structure of the
social network (such as the diameter of the graph and the relative degrees of stubborn and non-
stubborn agents), and the location of stubborn agents and their levels of stubbornness. Based on
such bounds, we study the convergence speed in social networks with different topologies such
as expander graphs, Erdos-Renyi random graphs, and small-world networks.
Finally, in concluding remarks, we discuss the implication of our results in applications where
limited advertising budget is to be used to convince a limited number of agents in social networks
to adopt, for example, a certain opinion about a product/topic. Such agents may in turn convince
others to change their opinions. Our results shed some light on the optimal selection of such
agents to trigger a faster spread of the advertised opinion throughout the social network.
C. Organization
The organization of the paper is as follows. We start with the definitions and introduce our
model in Section II. In Section III, we investigate opinion dynamics in social networks without
any stubborn agents. We consider social networks with at least one stubborn agent in Section
IV. Section V contains our concluding remarks. The proofs of the results are provided in the
appendices at the end of the paper.
D. Basic notations
All the vectors are column vectors. xT denotes the transpose of vector x. A diagonal matrix
with elements of vector x as diagonal entries is denoted by diag(x). xmax means the maximum
element of vector x. Similarly, xmin is the minimum element of vector x. 1n denotes a vector
of all ones of size n.
5II. MODEL AND DEFINITIONS
Consider a social network with n agents, denoted by a graph G(V , E) where agents are the
vertices and edges indicate the pairs of agents that have interactions. For each agent i, define
its neighborhood ∂i as the set of agents that node i interacts with, i.e., ∂i := {j : (i, j) ∈ E}.
Each agent i has an initial opinion xi(0). For simplicity we assume that the initial opinions are
some numbers between 0 and 1. For example, xi(0)’s could represent the people opinions about
the economic situation of the country, ranging from 0 to 1 with an opinion 1 corresponding
to perfect satisfaction with the current economy and 0 representing an extremely negative view
towards the economy. Let x(0) := [x1(0) · · ·xn(0)]T denote the vector of initial opinions. We
assume each agent i has a cost function of the form
Ji(xi, x∂i) =
1
2
∑
j∈∂i
(xi − xj)2 + 1
2
Ki(xi − xi(0))2, (1)
that he tries to minimize where Ki ≥ 0 measures the stubbornness of agent i regarding his
initial opinion1. When none of the agents are stubborn, correspondingly Ki’s are all zero, the
above formulation defines a coordination game with continuous payoffs because any vector of
opinions x = [x1 · · ·xn]T with x1 = x2 = · · · = xn is a Nash equilibrium. Here, we consider
a synchronous version of the game between the agents. At each time, every agent observes the
opinions of his neighbors and updates his opinion based on these observations and also his own
initial opinion in order to minimize his cost function. It is easy to check that, for every agent i,
the best-response strategy is
xi(t+ 1) =
1
di +Ki
∑
j∈∂i
xj(t) +
Ki
di +Ki
xi(0), (2)
where di = |∂i| is the degree of node i in graph G. Define a matrix An×n such that Aij = 1di+Ki
for (i, j) ∈ E and zero otherwise. Also define a diagonal matrix Bn×n with Bii = Kidi+Ki for
1 ≤ i ≤ n. Thus, in the matrix form, the best response dynamics are given by
x(t+ 1) = Ax(t) +Bx(0). (3)
1Although we have considered uniform weights for the neighbors, the results in the paper hold under a more general setting
when each agent puts a weight wij for his neighbor j.
6Iterating (3) shows that the vector of opinions at each time t ≥ 0 is
x(t) = Atx(0) +
t−1∑
s=0
AsBx(0). (4)
In the rest of the paper, we investigate the existence of equilibrium under the dynamics (3) in
different social networks, with or without stubborn agents. We also characterize the convergence
time of the dynamics, i.e., the amount of time that it takes for the agents’ opinions to get close to
the equilibrium. The equilibrium behavior is relevant only if the convergence time is reasonable
[11].
III. NO STUBBORN AGENTS
Convergence issues in the case of no stubborn agents is a special case of consensus, and has
been well studied. Here, we briefly review this work to put our later results in context. This also
allows us to compare the results in [11] to continuous opinion dynamics.
When there are no stubborn agents in the social network, i.e., all Ki’s are zero, A is a row-
stochastic matrix and B = 0 in (3). Without loss of generality, assume that A is irreducible
which corresponds to G being a connected graph. (Otherwise, A can be simply viewed as a
collection of diagonal sub-matrices with each sub-matrix describing the opinion dynamics on
one of the disconnected subgraphs of G.). For now, further assume that A is primitive, i.e., there
is a constant t0 such that all elements of At are strictly positive for all t ≥ t0. It is easy to show
that A is primitive if and only if the graph G is not bipartite, i.e., there is both an odd cycle and
an even cycle from every node to itself (we will later discuss the case of bipartite graphs).
A. Existence and characterization of the equilibrium
By the Perron-Frobenius theorem, the eigenvalues of A are such that 1 = λ1 > |λ2| ≥ · · · ≥
|λn|. The right eigenvector corresponding to λ1 = 1 is 1n up to a normalization constant. Let pi
be the left eigenvalue of A which is unique up to a normalization constant.
Using the eigen-decomposition of A (or Jordan normal decomposition if eigenvalues are not
distinct), it is well-known that limt→∞At = 1npiT up to a scalar multiple. In fact, since At is
row-stochastic,
∑n
i=1 pii = 1. Hence, pi can be interpreted as the unique stationary distribution
of a Markov chain with transition probability matrix A, so At must converge to the matrix with
7all rows equal to piT . Hence, the equilibrium under dynamics (3) is unique and simply given by
x(∞) := lim
t→∞
x(t) = 1npi
Tx(0). (5)
This shows that in equilibrium, agents will reach a consensus, i.e., all opinions are eventually
the same and equal where xi(∞) =
∑n
i=1 piixi(0), for all i ∈ V .
Note that A can be interpreted as transition probability matrix of a random walk over the graph
G with edge weights equal to one. It is easy to check that such random walk is reversible and
the stationary distribution of the random walk (i.e., left eigenvector of A corresponding to the
eigenvalue 1) is simply pii = di/2|E|, i ∈ V . Hence, the impact of each agent on the equilibrium
consensus is directly proportional to its degree. We state the result as the following lemma.
Lemma 1. In a social network G with no stubborn agents, and initial opinions vector x(0), the
best response dynamics will converge to the following unique equilibrium
xi(∞) = 1
2|E|
n∑
j=1
djxj(0); for all i ∈ V , (6)
where di is the degree of agent i.
B. Convergence time
First, we introduce a convenient norm on Rn that is linked to the stationary distribution pi of
the random walk on the social network graph. Let `2(pi) be the real vector space Rn endowed
with the scalar product
〈z, y〉pi :=
r∑
i=1
z(i)y(i)pi(i).
Then, the norm of z with respect to pi is defined as
‖z‖pi :=
(
r∑
i=1
z(i)2pi(i)
)1/2
.
Define the error as the vector
e(t) := x(t)− x(∞). (7)
The following lemma states that the error goes to zero geometrically at a rate equal to the second
largest eigenvalue modulus of A.
8Lemma 2. Under the best-response dynamics,
‖e(t)‖pi ≤ ρt2‖e(0)‖pi. (8)
where ρ2 := maxi 6=1 |λi| is the SLEM (Second Largest Eigenvalue Modulus) of A. 2
See Appendix A for the proof. We define the convergence time τ(ν) as
τ(ν) = inf{t ≥ 0 : ‖e(t)‖pi ≤ ν}, (9)
where 0 < ν  1 is some small positive number.
It can be seen that under the pi-norm, ‖e(t)‖pi = Varpi(e(t)), i.e., the variance of e(t) with
respect to distribution pi. This ensures that ‖e(0)‖pi ≤ 1 even when n→∞ because we assumed
that initial opinions are bounded between zero and one. A simple calculation, based on Lemma
2, reveals that(
1
1− ρ2 − 1
)
log
(‖e(0)‖pi
ν
)
≤ τ(ν) ≤ 1
1− ρ2 log
(‖e(0)‖pi
ν
)
.
In particular, the convergence time is Θ
(
1
1−ρ2
)
as the number of agents n grows.
C. Bipartite networks and noisy opinion dynamics
Next, we consider the case that the social network is bipartite. One important example of
such networks is a ring network with an even number of agents n. The ring graph is formed by
placing the agents on a circle and connecting each agent to two of his nearest neighbors. In this
case, the best-response dynamics do not converge to an equilibrium. For example, for the case
of the ring network with n even, matrix A is simply
Aij =
 1/2 if |i− j| = 1 or n− 10 otherwise.
Then, it is easy to see that, as t→∞, At alternates between two matrices for t even and t odd,
in fact, for t odd,
lim
t→∞
A
(t)
ij =
 2/n if |i− j| ≡ 1 mod 2,0 otherwise
2 In Euclidian norm,
√
pimin‖e(t)‖2 ≤ ‖e(t)‖pi ≤ √pimax‖e(t)‖2, and so ‖e(t)‖2 ≤ ρt2
√
dmax
dmin
‖e(0)‖2, where dmax =
maxi di and dmin = mini di.
9and for t even,
lim
t→∞
A
(t)
ij =
 2/n if |i− j| ≡ 0 mod 20 otherwise.
This shows that, as t→∞, the opinion of each agent i does not converge and alternates between
two values. The opinion of agent i at an odd t will be the average of the initial opinions of the
agents {j : |i − j| ≡ 1 mod 2} and at even t, it will be the average of the initial opinions of
the agents {j : |i− j| ≡ 0 mod 2}.
In practice, not everyone completely ignores his own previous opinion and might be slightly
biased by his old opinion. Hence, we can consider a noisy version of the best-response dynamics
as follows
x
()
i (t+ 1) = (1− )
( 1
di
∑
j∈∂i
xj(t)
)
+ xi(t), (10)
for some self-confidence  > 0. Here, we assume all agents have the same self-confidence
but the argument can be adapted for different self-confidences as well. Introducing such self-
confidences, adds self-loops to graph G which ensures that G is not bipartite, or, correspondingly,
A() is primitive where A()ij =  if j = i and A
()
ij = (1− )/di if j ∈ ∂i. Hence, using the results
in the previous section, the noisy best-response dynamics will converge to
x
()
i (∞) =
n∑
j=1
pi
()
j xj(0); for all i ∈ V ,
where pi() = [pi()1 · · · pi()n ]T is the unique stationary distribution of the Markov chain3 with
transition probability matrix A(). By reversibility of A(), pi()i = pii =
di
2|E| independently of .
Hence,
x
()
i (∞) = xi(∞) =
1
2|E|
n∑
j=1
djxj(0), for all i ∈ V ,
i.e., agents will converge to the same equilibrium as in the non-partite case.
To investigate the convergence rate, note that A() = I+ (1− )A, so λ()i = + (1− )λi(A).
Especially, λ()2 =  + (1 − )λ2(A) and λ()n = −1 + 2 because λn(A) = −1 for random
walk on bipartite graph. Hence, as far as the scaling law with n concerns, the convergence
time is Θ
(
1
1−ρ()2
)
for ρ()2 = max{λ()2 , |λ()n |}, which, for fixed , means that the convergence
3The terminologies random walk and Markov chain can be used interchangeably here.
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time is Θ
(
1
1−λ2(A)
)
. Similarly, we can consider the noisy best-response dynamics for the non-
partite graphs. Again, introducing self-confidence in opinion dynamics does not change the
equilibrium. Moreover, the second largest and the smallest eigenvalues will be respectively given
by λ()2 =  + (1 − )λ2(A) and λ()n > −1 + 2. Hence, the convergence time is again of the
order Θ
(
1
1−λ2(A)
)
as n grows.
Hence, the convergence time of the best-response dynamics is determined by λ2(A) of the
corresponding random walk over the social graph.
Example 1. In this example, we make a comparison between ring graph and complete graph
with n nodes. The complete graph represents situation when all agents can communicate with
each other with no constrains, while in the ring graph, each agent can only communicate with
his two nearest neighbors. Qualitatively, the complete graph and the ring graph represent two
extreme ends of the spectrum of graphs [7]. Note in both cases the (noisy) best-response dynamics
converge to the average of initial opinions. It is easy to see that λ2(A) is 1n−1 for the complete
graph and cos(2pi
n
) ≈ 1 − pi
n2
for the ring. Hence, while both of the graphs have the same
equilibrium, convergence in the complete graph is much faster than convergence in the ring, in
fact, O(1) vs. O(n2).
It is interesting to compare our continuous coordination game with a two-strategies coordi-
nation game in Ellison [11] where agents behave according to a noisy best-response dynamics.
Introducing the noise eliminates the possibility of multiple equilibria and leads to convergence to
the “risk dominant“ strategy throughout the network. He studied the rate of convergence for the
complete graph and the ring graph and showed that the dynamics converges very slowly in the
complete graph and very fast in the ring network. This is in total contrast with the above example
as we observe that, in a continuous coordination game, the best-response dynamics converge
faster in the complete graph compared to the ring graph. This can be justified by noticing that
the mechanism for spreading a common strategy throughout the network is inherently different in
the continuous and the two-strategy coordination game. In the two-strategy coordination game,
existence of a sufficiently large cluster of agents playing the risk-dominant strategy needed in
order to prevail the risk-dominant strategy throughout the network. As Elision stated, in the ring
network, the required size of such clusters is very smaller than the required size of clusters for
the complete graph. Hence, it takes an extremely long time to see such clusters in the complete
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graph starting from arbitrary initial conditions. In the continuous coordination game, the (noisy)
best-response dynamics converge to the average of initial opinions in both graphs. In the complete
graph, after the first iteration, the opinion of each node is the average of the initial opinions
of all agents excluding its own opinion which has little importance especially when n is large.
In the ring graph, averaging the initial opinions of an agents’s neighbors could still be very far
from the average of all the initial opinions and increasing n will make this gap even larger.
There is a rich literature on approximating λ2(A) of a random walk over different types of
graphs, e.g., see Chapter 2 of [7] for a survey. Intuitively, the convergence time is dominated
by the highly connected component of the graph which is loosely connected to the rest of
the network (captured by the notion of conductance of the Markov chain [5], or the edge
isoperimetric function of the graph). For example, expander graphs have fast convergence (with
a convergence time independent of n) because the number of connections from every subgraph,
of size less than n/2, to the rest of the network is at least a constant fraction of total connections
within the subgraph independent of n. We do not proceed in this direction further and in the
next section, we study the more interesting case of social networks with stubborn agents.
IV. IMPACT OF STUBBORN AGENTS
A. Existence and characterization of equilibrium
Consider a connected social network G(V , E) in which at least one of the agents is stubborn,
i. e., Ki > 0 for some i ∈ V . Then A is an irreducible sub-stochastic matrix with the row-
sum of at least one row less than one. Let ρ1(A) := maxi |λi(A)| denote the spectral radius
of A. It is well-known that ρ1(A) of a sub-stochastic matrix A is less than one, and hence,
limt→∞At = 0. Therefore, by Perron-Ferobenius theorem, the largest eigenvalue should be
positive, real 1 > λ1 > 0 and ρ1(A) = λ1. Hence, in this case, based on (4), the equilibrium
exists and is equal to
x(∞) := lim
t→∞
x(t) =
∞∑
s=0
AsBx(0) = (I − A)−1Bx(0). (11)
Therefore, since Bii = 0 for all non-stubborn agents i, the initial opinions of non-stubborn agents
will vanish eventually and have no effect on the equilibrium (11).
The matrix form (11) does not give any insight on how the equilibrium depends on the graph
structure and the stubborn agents. Next, we describe the equilibrium in terms of explicit quantities
12
that depend on the graph structure, location of stubborn agents and their levels of stubbornness.
Let S ⊆ V be the set of stubborn agents and |S| ≥ 1. Any agent i in S is either fully
stubborn, meaning its corresponding Ki =∞, or it is partially stubborn, meaning 0 < Ki <∞.
Hence, S = SF ∪ SP where SF is the set of fully stubborn agents and SP is the set of partially
stubborn agents4. Without loss of generality, index the partially stubborn agents with 1, · · · , |SP |,
index the fully stubborn agents with |SP |+ 1, · · · , |S| and finally the non-stubborn agents with
|S|+ 1, · · · , n. Next, we construct a weighted graph Gˆ(Vˆ , Eˆ) based on the original social graph
G(V , E) and the location of partially stubborn agents SP and their levels of stubbornness Ki,
i ∈ SP .
Assign weight 1 to all the edges of G. Connect a new vertex ui to each i ∈ SP and assign a
weight Ki to the corresponding edge. Index the new vertex connected to i ∈ SP by n+i. We use
the node ui and its index n+i interchangeably. Let Vˆ := V∪{ui : i ∈ SP} = {1, 2, · · · , n+|SP |}
and Eˆ := E ∪ {(i, ui) : i ∈ SP}. Also let wij denote the weight of edge (i, j) ∈ Eˆ . Then Gˆ(Vˆ , Eˆ)
is a weighted graph with weights wij = 1 for all (i, j) ∈ E (the edges of G) and wiui = Ki for
all i ∈ SP . Let u(SP ) = {ui : i ∈ SP}.
Define wi :=
∑
j:(i,j)∈Eˆ wij as the weighted degree of vertex i ∈ Vˆ . It should be clear that
wi =

di +Ki for i ∈ SP ,
di for i ∈ V\SP ,
Kj for i = uj, j ∈ SP .
(12)
Consider the random walk Y (t) over Gˆ where the probability of transition from vertex i to vertex
j is Pij =
wij
wi
. Assume the walk starts from some initial vertex Y (0) = i ∈ V . For any j ∈ Vˆ
define
τj := inf{t ≥ 0 : Y (t) = j}, (13)
as the first hitting time to vertex j. Also define τ :=
∧
j∈SF∪u(SP ) τj as the first time that the
random walk hits any of the vertices in SF ∪ u(SP ). The following Lemma characterizes the
equilibrium. The proof is provided in Appendix E.
4We need to distinguish between the case 0 < Ki <∞ and Ki =∞ for technical reasons; however, as it will become clear
later, the conclusions for Ki =∞ are equivalent to those for Ki <∞ if we let Ki →∞
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Lemma 3. The best-response dynamics converge to a unique equilibrium where the opinion of
each agent is a convex combination of the initial opinions of the stubborn agents. Based on the
random walk over the graph Gˆ,
xi(∞) =
∑
j∈SP
Pi(τ = τuj)xj(0) +
∑
j∈SF
Pi(τ = τj)xj(0); for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n, (14)
where Pi(τ = τk), k ∈ SF ∪ u(SP ), is the probability that the random walk hits vertex k first,
among vertices in SF ∪ u(SP ), given the random walk starts from vertex i.
Note that limKi→∞ Pi(τ = τui) = 1 for any partially stubborn agent i ∈ SP . This intuitively
makes sense because as an agent i becomes more stubborn, his opinion will get closer to his
own opinion and behaves similarly to a fully stubborn agent.
It should be clear that when there is only one stubborn agent or there are multiple stubborn
agents with identical initial opinions, eventually the opinion of every agent will converge to the
same opinion as the initial opinion of the stubborn agents.
In general, to characterize the equilibrium, one needs to find probabilities Pi(τ = τk), k ∈
SF ∪ u(SP ). Such hitting probabilities have an interesting electrical network interpretation (see
Chapter 3 of [23]) as follows. Let Gˆ be an electrical network where each edge (i, j) ∈ Eˆ has a
conductance wij (or resistance 1/wij). Then Pi(τ = τk) is the voltage of node i in the electrical
network where node k ∈ SF∪u(SP ) is a fixed voltage source of 1 volt and nodes SF∪u(SP )\{k}
are grounded (zero voltage). This determines the contribution of the voltage source k where all
the other sources are turned off. Now let vertices SF ∪ u(SP ) be fixed voltage sources where
the voltage of each source i ∈ SF is xi(0) volts and the voltage of each source uj ∈ u(SP ),
j ∈ SP , is xj(0) volts. By the linearity of the electrical networks (the superposition theorem in
circuit analysis), the voltage of each node in such an electrical network equals to the sum of
the responses caused by each voltage source acting alone, while all other voltage sources are
grounded. Therefore, the opinion of agent i, at equilibrium (36), is just the voltage of node i in
the electrical network model. We mention the result as the following lemma and will prove it
directly in Appendix C.
Lemma 4. Consider G as an electrical network where the conductance of each edge is 1 and
each stubborn agent i is a voltage source of xi(0) volts with an internal conductance Ki.
Fully stubborn agents are ideal voltage sources with infinite internal conductance (zero internal
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resistance). Then, under the best-response dynamics, the opinion of each agent at equilibrium
is just its voltage in the electrical network.
We illustrate the use of the above lemma through the following example.
Example 2. Consider a one-dimensional social graph, where agents are located on integers
1 ≤ i ≤ n. Assume nodes 1 and n are stubborn with initial opinions x1(0) and xn(0), and
stubbornness parameters K1 > 0 and Kn > 0. Then graph Gˆ consists of the original line network,
where each edge weight is one, and two extra nodes u1 and un connected to 1 and n with edge
weights K1 and Kn. Using the electrical network model, the current is the same over all edges
and equal to I = (x1(0)−xn(0))( 1K1 + 1Kn +n−1)−1. Hence, xi(∞) = vi = x1(0)−I( 1K1 +i−1),
for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, i. e.,
xi(∞) =
(
1− K
−1
1 + i− 1
K−11 +K−1n + n− 1
)
x1(0) +
(
K−11 + i− 1
K−11 +K−1n + n− 1
)
xn(0)
As K1 increases, the final opinion of i will get closer to stubborn agent 1, and as Kn increases,
it will get closer to the opinion of agent n.
B. Convergence Time
Although we are able to characterize the equilibrium in all cases, the equilibrium makes
sense only if the time needed to converge to equilibrium is reasonable. Next, we characterize
convergence time in the case that there is at least one stubborn agent. Let e(t) = x(t)− x(∞)
be the error vector as defined before. Trivially ei(t) = 0 for all fully stubborn agents i ∈ SF .
Let e˜(t) := [ei(t) : i ∈ V\SF ]T denote the errors for all other agents. The convergence to
the equilibrium (11) is geometric with a rate equal to largest eigenvalue of A as stated by the
following lemma whose proof is provided in Appendix D.
Lemma 5. Let p˜i = [wi
Z
: i ∈ V\SF ]T for the weights wi as in (12) and Z be the normalizing
constant such that
∑
i∈V\SF p˜ii = 1. Then,
‖e˜(t)‖p˜i ≤ (λA)t‖e˜(0)‖p˜i, (15)
where λA is the largest eigenvalue of A.
Note that in Euclidian norm,
√
p˜imin‖e˜(t)‖2 ≤ ‖e˜(t)‖p˜i ≤
√
p˜imax‖e˜(t)‖2, thus,
‖e(t)‖2 ≤ (λA)t
√
wmax
wmin
‖e(0)‖2,
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where wmax := maxi∈V\SF wi and wmin := mini∈V\SF wi.
Hence, the convergence is geometric with a rate at least equal to largest eigenvalue of A.
Defining the convergence time as the familiar form τ(ν) := inf{t ≥ 0 : ‖e˜(t)‖p˜i ≤ ν} for some
fixed ν > 0, we have(
1
1− λA − 1
)
log
(‖e˜(0)‖p˜i
ν
)
≤ τ(ν) ≤ 1
1− λA log
(‖e˜(0)‖p˜i
ν
)
,
so again τ(ν) = Θ
(
1
1−λA
)
as n grows. Let T := 1
1−λA . With a little abuse of terminology, we
also call T the convergence time.
Since the exact characterization of λA is difficult, we will derive appropriate upper-bounds
and lower-bounds for it that depend on the graph structure, the location of stubborn agents and
their levels of stubbornness. The techniques used in deriving the bounds here are similar to the
techniques used in deriving geometric bounds for the second largest eigenvalue of stochastic
matrices [25], [26].
Consider the weighted graph Gˆ(Vˆ , Eˆ) as defined in Section IV-A. A path from a vertex i
to another vertex j in Gˆ is a collection of oriented edges that connect i to j. For any vertex
i ∈ V\SF , consider a path γi from i to the set SF ∪ u(SP ) that does not intersect itself, i.e.,
γi = {(i, i1), (i1, i2), · · · , (im, j)} for some j ∈ SF ∪ u(SP ).
Proceeding along the lines of Diaconis-Stroock [25], we get the following bound that yields
an upper-bound on the convergence time (see Appendix E for the proof).
Lemma 6. Consider the weighted graph Gˆ. Given a set of paths {γi : i ∈ V\SF}, from V\SF
to SF ∪ u(SP ), let |γi|w :=
∑
(s,t)∈γi
1
wst
. Then, the convergence time T ≤ 2ξ where
ξ := max
(x,y)∈Eˆ
ξ(x, y),
and, for each edge (x, y) ∈ Eˆ ,
ξ(x, y) :=
∑
i:γi3(x,y)
wi|γi|w. (16)
It is also possible to proceed along the lines of Sinclair [26]. This gives a different bound
stated in the following lemma.
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Lemma 7. Consider the weighted graph Gˆ(Vˆ , Eˆ). Given a set of paths {γi : i ∈ V\SF} from
V\SF to SF ∪ u(SP ), we have T ≤ 2η where
η := max
(x,y)∈Eˆ
η(x, y), (17)
and, for each edge (x, y) ∈ Eˆ ,
η(x, y) :=
1
wxy
∑
i:γi3(x,y)
wi|γi|. (18)
The above lemma is very similar to the bound reported in [27] without proof but differs by
a factor of 2. The factor 2 is not important in investigating the order of the convergence time;
however, in graphs with finite number of agents, ignoring this factor yields convergence times
that are smaller than the actual convergence time. Therefore, we have included a short proof in
Appendix E for the above lemma.
Intuitively, both ξ(x, y) and η(x, y) are measures of congestion over the edge (x, y) due to
paths that pass through (x, y). In general, computing the upper-bound using Lemma 7 is easier
than using Lemma 6.
An upper bound on 1− λA, and thus a lower-bound on the convergence time T , is given by
the following lemma whose proof is provided in Appendix E
Lemma 8. Consider the weighted graph Gˆ(Vˆ , Eˆ), then
1− λA ≤ min
B⊆V\SF
ψ(B; Gˆ), (19)
where ψ(B; Gˆ) :=
∑
i∈B,j /∈B wij∑
i∈B wi
. The minimum is achieved for some connected subgraph with
vertex set B.
Next, as an example of applications of the above bounds, we study the special cases of the
complete graph and the ring graph with one stubborn agent. In these cases, Lemma 7 yields
tighter results and it is also easier to use than Lemma 6.
Example 3 (Complete graph vs. Ring graph). Assume there is one stubborn agent, node 1, with
K1 > 0. In each case, construct the weighted graph Gˆ and let γ = {γi : i ∈ V} be the set of
shortest paths from nodes V to u1. For the complete graph, the congestion over (1, u1) is exactly
η(1, u1) =
1
K1
(K1 + (n− 1) + 2(n− 1)2),
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and the congestion over any other edge (i, 1) : 1 ≤ i ≤ n is simply η(i, 1) = n − 1. Hence,
for large values of K1, the congestion is dominated by (1, u1) and for small values of K1, it is
dominated by an edge (i, 1), for some 1 ≤ i ≤ n. More accurately,
T ≤
 2
K1+(n−1)+2(n−1)2
K1
; if K1 ≤ (n−1)+2(n−1)2n−2
2(n− 1); otherwise
Next, consider a ring graph with odd number of nodes. The congestion over (1, u1) is
η(1, u1) =
1
K1
(2 +K1 + 2(2
(n−1)/2∑
i=1
i)).
Since, for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, η(i, 1, γ) ≤ η(2, 1, γ), it is enough to find the congestion over the edge
(2, 1) which is η(2, 1) = 2
∑(n−1)/2
i=1 i. This shows that
T ≤

2+K1+(n2−1)/2
K1
; if K1 ≤ 8+2(n2−1)n2−5
n2−1
4
; otherwise
Figure 3 shows the upper-bound in each graph and compares it with the exact value of 1
1−λA
calculated numerically for n = 11. As K1 →∞, the stubborn agent approaches a fully stubborn
agent.
We can also compute lower-bounds, based on Lemma 8 as follows. The set B that achieves
the minimum in (19), either includes node 1 or not. If 1 ∈ B, then it is easy to see that
minB⊆V:1∈B ψ(B; Gˆ) = ψ(V ; Gˆ) = K1K1+2|E| in both graphs. If 1 /∈ B, then minB⊆V:1/∈B ψ(B; Gˆ) =
minB⊆V:1/∈B ψ(B;G). In the case of the complete graph,
min
B⊆V:1/∈B
ψ(B;G) = ψ(V\{1};G) = n− 1
(n− 1)2 =
1
n− 1 ,
and in the case of the ring graph,
min
B⊆V:1/∈B
ψ(B;G) = ψ(V\{1};G) = 2
2(n− 1) =
1
n− 1 .
Hence, the lower bound is the following. For the complete graph
T ≥

K1+n(n−1)
K1
; if K1 ≤ n(n−1)(n−2)
n− 1; otherwise,
and for the ring
T ≥
 K1+2nK1 ; if K1 ≤ 2n(n−2)n− 1; otherwise.
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Fig. 1. The comparison of the convergence time between complete and ring graphs with n = 11 nodes with one stubborn
agent.
C. Canonical bounds via shortest paths
Let γ = {γi : i ∈ V\SF} be the set of shortest paths from vertices V\SF to a the set
SF ∪ u(SP ), so, in fact, for each i ∈ V\SF , γi = γij for some j ∈ SF ∪ u(SP ). See Figure 2
for an example. Let Γj ⊆ V\SF be the set of nodes that are connected to j ∈ SF ∪ u(SP ) via
the shortest paths. Also let |γ| := maxi∈V\SF |γi| be the length of maximum of such shortest
paths and |Γ| := maxj∈SF∪u(SP ) |Γj| be the maximum number of nodes connected to any node
in SF ∪ u(SP ). For example, in Figure 2, |Γ| = 4 and |γ| = 3.
For each partially stubborn agent j ∈ SP ,
η(j, uj) =
1
Kj
(Kj + dj +
∑
i∈Γj
di|γi|)
≤ 1 + dˆ+ |γ||Γ|d˜
Kmin
,
where d˜ := maxi∈V\S di is the maximum degree of non-stubborn agents, dˆ := maxi∈S di is the
maximum degree of stubborn agents, and Kmin := minj∈SP Kj is the minimum stubbornness.
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Fig. 2. A social network consisting of 9 agents. Vertex 1 is a partially stubborn agent and vertex 2 is a fully stubborn agent.
The colored edges show the shortest paths from the non-stubborn agents to the set of stubborn agents.
Hence, the congestion is dominated by some edge (j, uj), j ∈ SP , only if the stubbornness Kj
is sufficiently small.
It is easy to show that all the paths that pass through an edge (x, y) ∈ E are connected to the
same j ∈ SF ∪ u(SP ), or equivalently to the same stubborn agent. So for each (x, y) ∈ E ,
η(x, y) =
∑
i:γi3(x,y)
di|γi| ≤ |γ|Bd˜,
where
B := max
(x,y)∈E
|{i : γi 3 (x, y)}|, (20)
is the bottleneck constant, i.e., the maximum number of shortest paths that pass through any
link of the social network. It is clear that |Γ|/dˆ ≤ B ≤ |Γ| because the maximum bottleneck is
at least equal to the bottleneck over an edge directly connected to a stubborn agent. Therefore,
for Kmin ≤ K∗ := dˆ+|γ||Γ|d˜|γ|Bd˜−1 , η is dominated by congestion over some edge (j, uj), j ∈ SP , and
T ≤ 2
(
1 +
dˆ+ |γ||Γ|d˜
Kmin
)
. (21)
For Kmin > K∗, η is dominated by an edge of the social network which is the bottleneck, and
in this regime
T ≤ 2|γ|Bd˜. (22)
Dependence on |γ|, in both regimes, intuitively makes sense as it represents the minimum time
required to reach any node in the network from stubborn agents. Hence, the convergence time in
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general depends on the structure of the social network and the location of the stubborn agents and
their levels of stubbornness. There is a dichotomy for high and low levels of stubbornness. For
high levels of stubbornness, and in the extreme case of fully stubborn agents, the opinion of the
stubborn agent is almost fixed and the convergence time is dominated by the the bottleneck edge
and the structure of the social network. For low levels of stubbornness, the transient opinion
of stubborn agent may deviate a lot from its equilibrium which could deteriorate the speed
of convergence. In fact, for very low levels of stubbornness, this could be the main factor in
determining the convergence time. It is worth pointing out that adding more fully stubborn
agents, with not necessarily equal initial opinions, or increasing the stubbornness of the agents
makes the convergence faster.
D. Scaling Laws
In this section, we use the canonical bounds to derive scaling laws for the convergence time
as the size of the social network n grows. For any social network, we can consider two cases:
(i) There exists no fully stubborn agent, i. e., all the stubborn agents are partially stubborn (ii)
At least, one of the agents is fully stubborn.
In both cases, the upper-bound on the convergence time is given by (21) and (22) depending
on the levels of stubbornness of partially stubborn agents. In case (ii), if all the stubborn agents
are fully stubborn, then the upper-bound on the convergence time is given by (22).
To get the lower-bounds, we consider the set B in (19) to include all the nodes V\SF . This
gives the following lower-bound for the case (i)
T ≥ 1 + 2|E|∑
j∈SP Kj
, (23)
and, for the case (ii),
T ≥
∑
j∈SP Kj + 2|E| −
∑
j∈SF dj∑
j∈SP Kj +
∑
j∈SF dj
. (24)
In investigating the scaling laws, the scaling of the number of stubborn agents and their levels
of stubbornness with n could play an important role. In the rest of this section, we study scaling
laws in graphs with a fixed number of stubborn agents, with fixed levels of stubbornness, as the
total number of agent n in the network grows. Then, in any connected graph G, the smallest
possible lower-bound on the convergence time is T = Ω(n) in the case (i), and T = Ω( |E|∑
j∈SF dj
)
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in the case (ii) which could be as small as Ω(1). It is possible to combine the upperbounds
(21) and (22) to obtain a (looser) upper-bound that holds for a fixed number of stubborn agents,
with any mixture of partially/fully stubborn agents. Let dmax be the maximum degree of the
social graph (possibly depending on n). The upper-bounds show that T = O(|γ|ndmax) for
Kmin small enough (i.e., smaller than a threshold depending on the structure of the graph) and
T = O(|γ|Bdmax) otherwise. Recall that B was the bottleneck constant, and obviously B < n,
implying that T = O(n|γ|dmax), for a fixed number of stubborn agents consisting of any mixture
of partially/fully stubborn agents. Furthermore, it should be clear that |γ| is at most equal to the
diameter δ of the graph, hence, as a naive bound,
T = O(nδdmax). (25)
Dependence on the diameter intuitively makes sense as it represents the minimum time required
to reach any node in the network from an arbitrary stubborn agent.
Fastest Convergence
It should be intuitively clear that a graph G with a stubborn agent directly connected to n− 1
non-stubborn agents and with no edges between the non-stubborn agents should have the fastest
convergence. In fact, if the stubborn agent is partially stubborn (case (i)), construct Gˆ by adding
an extra node u1 and connect it to the stubborn agent 1 by an edge of weight K1. Then, it
is easy to check that η(1, u1) = 1 +
3(n−1)
K1
and η(i, 1) = 2, 2 ≤ i ≤ n. Hence, T = O(n),
and considering the general lower-bound T = Ω(n), T = Θ(n) is indeed the sharp order. If the
stubborn agent is fully stubborn , then η(i, 1) = 1 for all i, thus T ≤ 2 achieving the lower-bound
in case (ii).
Complete graph and Ring graph
For the complete graph, with a fixed set of stubborn agents, d˜ = dˆ = n− 1, |Γ| = O(n) and
|γ| = 2 and K∗ = O(n). If at least one of the agents is partially stubborn, the upper-bound
follows from (21) which gives T = O(n2), and, considering the lowerbound (23), T = Θ(n2)
is the right order. If all the stubborn agents are fully stubborn, the upper-bound follows from
(22) which is T = O(n) because obviously B = 1 in the complete graph. Using (24) gives a
lower-bound Ω(n), so T = Θ(n) if there is a fixed number of fully stubborn agents.
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For the ring network, Ω(n) is a lower-bound in both cases. To get an upper-bound note that
K∗ = O(1), however, B = O(n), d˜ = dˆ = 2, |Γ| = O(n), and |γ| = O(n). Hence, for all fixed
levels of stubbornness, and for any fixed number of fully/partially stubborn agents, T = O(n2).
Figure 3 verifies the results above, as we saw, in the case of one stubborn agent with a fixed
K1, and n large enough (larger than a constant depending on the value of K1), the ring network
has a faster convergence than the complete graph. For any fixed n, and K1 large enough, the
complete graph has a faster convergence than the ring.
Expander graphs and Tress
Expanders are graph sequences such that any graph in the sequence has good expansion
property, meaning that there exists α > 0 (independent of n) such that each subset S of nodes
with size |S| ≤ n/2 has at least α|S| edges to the rest of the network. Expander graphs have
found extensive applications in computer science and mathematics (see the survey of [35] for
a discussion of several applications). An important class of expanders are d-regular expanders,
where each node has a constant degree d. Existence of d-regular expanders, for d > 2, was
first established in [37] via a probabilistic argument. There are various explicit constructions of
d-regular expander graphs, e.g., the Zig Zag construction in [34] or the construction in [36].
Recall the naive upper-bound (25) when there is a fixed number of (fully/partially) stubborn
agents. So, for any bounded degree graph, with maximum degree d > 2, and diameter δ, T =
O(nδ). It is easy to see that the diameter of a bounded degree graph, with maximum degree
d, is at least logd−1 n (Lemma 4.1, [28]). In fact, for a d-regular tree or a d-regular expander,
δ = O(log n) 5. Hence, for these graphs, T = O(n log n) which is almost as fast as the smallest
possible convergence time Ω(n) when there is at least on partially stubborn agent. When all the
stubborn agents are fully stubborn, T = O(n log n) still holds, by (22) because B = Θ(n) in any
bounded degree graph, but, in this case, the convergence is slow compared to the best possible
convergence time Ω(1).
5To show the latter, consider the lazy random walk over a d-regular expander graph, i.e., with transition probability matrix
P = M
2d
+ I
2
where M is the graph’s adjacency matrix. Then, it follows from Cheeger’s inequality and the expansion property,
that the spectral gap 1− λ2(P ) ≥ α28d2 . Using the relation between the special gap and the diameter δ < logn1−λ2(P ) [38], we get
δ ≤ 8d2
α2
logn.
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Erdos-Renyi Random Graphs
Consider an Erod-Renyi random graph with n nodes where each node is connected to any
other node with probability p, i.e., each edge appears independently with probability p. To ensure
that the graph is connected, we consider p = λ logn
n
for some number λ > 1. Assume there
are a fixed set of stubborn agents with fixed stubbornness parameters. Using the well-known
results, the maximin degree of an Erdos-Renyi random graph is O(log n) with high probability,
i.e., with probability approaching to 1 as n grows [41]. Also we know that the diameter is
O
(
logn
lognp
)
= O
(
logn
log(λ logn)
)
with high probability (in fact, the diameter concentrates only on a
few distinct values [29]). Hence, using the naive upper-bound (25) gives T = O
(
n log
2 n
log logn
)
with
high probability. This is very close to the best possible convergence time in case (i) but far from
the best possible convergence time in case (ii).
Small world graphs
The Erdos-Renyi model does not capture many spatial and structural aspects of social networks
and, hence, is not a realistic model of social networks [28]. Motivated by the small world
phenomenon observed by Milgram [30], Strogatz-Watts [31] and Kleinberg [32] proposed models
that illustrate how graphs with spatial structure can have small diameters, thus, providing more
realistic models of social networks. We consider a variant of these models, proposed in [28], and
characterize the convergence time to equilibrium in presence of stubborn agents. We consider
two-dimensional graphs for simplicity but results are extendable to the higher dimensional graphs
as well.
Start with a social network as a grid
√
n×√n of n nodes. Hence, nodes i and j are neighbors
if their l1 distance ‖i − j‖ = |xi − xj| + |yi − yj| is equal to 1. Following the arguments for
the bounded-degree graphs with fixed number of stubborn agents, T = O(nδ), and in the grid,
δ = 2
√
n obviously, which yields T = O(n
√
n). Note that changing the location of the stubborn
agents can change the convergence time only by a constant and does not change the order.
Now assume that each node creates q shortcuts to other nodes in the network. A node i
chooses another node j as the destination of the shortcut with probability ‖i−j‖
−α∑
k 6=i ‖i−k‖−α , for some
parameter α > 0. Parameter α determines the distribution of the shortcuts as large values of α
produce mostly local shortcuts and small values of α increase the chance of long-range shortcuts.
In particular, q = 1 and α = 0 recovers the Strogatz-Watts model where the shortcuts are selected
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uniformly at random. It is shown in [33] that for α < 2, the graph is an expander with high
probability and hence, using the inequality between the diameter and the spectral gap [38], its
diameter is of the order of O(log n) with high probability. We also need to characterize the
maximum degree in such graphs. The following lemma is probably known but we were not able
to find a reference for it, hence, we have included its proof in Appendix F for completeness.
Lemma 9. Under the small-world network model, dmax = O(log n) with high probability.
Hence, putting everything together, using the upper-bound (25), we get T = O(n log2 n). This
differs from the smallest possible convergence time in case (i) by a factor of log2 n but far from
Ω(1) in case (ii).
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We viewed opinion dynamics as a local interaction game over a social network. When there
are no stubborn agents, the best-response dynamics converge to a common opinion in which
the impact of the initial opinion of each agent is proportional to its degree. In the presence of
stubborn agents, the dynamics converge to an equilibrium in which the opinion of each agent
is a convex combination of the initial opinions of the stubborn agents. The coefficients of such
convex combination are related to appropriately defined hitting probabilities of the random walk
over the social network’s graph. An alternative interpretation is based on an electrical network
model of the social network where, at equilibrium, the opinion of each agent is simply its voltage
in the electrical network.
The bounds on the convergence time in the paper can be interpreted in terms of location
and stubbornness levels of stubborn agents, and graph properties such as diameter, degrees,
and the so-called bottleneck constant (20). The bounds provide relatively tight orders for the
convergence time in the case of a fixed number of partially stubborn agents (case (i)) but there
is a gap between the lower-bound and the upper-bound when some of the stubborn agents are
fully stubborn (case (ii)). Tightening the bounds in case (ii) remains as a future work.
At this point, we discuss the implication of our results in applications where limited advertising
budget is to be used to convince a few agents to adopt, for example, a certain opinion about a
product/topic. The goal is the optimal selection of such agents to trigger a faster spread of the
advertised opinion throughout the social network. This, in turn, implies that, over a finite time,
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more agents will be biased towards the advertised opinion. Similar leader selection problems
have been discussed in [12], [9], [17] for different applications where the goal is to select a
set of M agents with fixed states to optimize the system performance such as minimizing the
convergence time to consensus [12], minimizing the error when the observations are noisy [9],
or maximizing the impact of stubborn agents on the long-run expected opinions of the agents
[17]. The common methodology is to show that the objective is a sub-modular set function and
use the sub-modular optimization framework in, e.g., [40], to produce a greedy procedure where
agents are added according to a greedy sequence. Although the greedy algorithm is useful, it
does not answer the question in its simplest form M = 1, and may involve the inversion of
typically large matrices [12] in social networks with very large number of users.
Using the simple bound (22), the question is reduced to where to place a fixed number of
fully-stubborn agents in order to minimize |γ|Bd˜. Recall that γ is the maximum length of
shortest paths from non-stubborn agents to stubborn agents, B is the bottleneck constant defined
in (20), and d˜ is the maximum degree of non-stubborn agents. Since empirical graphs of social
networks exhibit small-world network characteristics, |γ| is already very small (it is less than
the diameter of the graph which is already a log n quantity), and hence, the product B · d˜ is
the dominating factor. It is believed that degree distribution in many networks, such as social
networks, Internet topology, WWW induced graph, Hollywood graph, etc, follows a power-law
distribution (see [39] for a survey with more examples). Heuristically, when there are a few very
high degree nodes and most of the nodes are of low degrees, selecting the high degree nodes, as
stubborn agents, reduces d˜ dramatically and also reduces B because many agents (the neighbors
of the stubborn agents) are now directly connected to the stubborn agents. On the other hand,
selecting the possibly low degree nodes of bottleneck edges as stubborn agents reduces B but
this reduction is at most by a factor equal to low degrees of such nodes. Therefore, in general,
the high degree nodes seem to be good candidates for placement of stubborn agents. It will be
certainly interesting to establish the validity of such a heuristic more rigorously.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
A similar result as Lemma 2 is standard when analyzing the convergence of the probability
distribution of a Markov chain. Opinion dynamics are different than probability evolution in
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Markov chains, but the same ideas as in the case of probability distributions also work when
analyzing the convergence of opinion dynamics. We present the proof of Lemma 2 here for
completeness.
We can compute the error recursively as follows.
e(t+ 1) = Ax(t)− 1npiTx(0)− 1npiTx(t) + 1npiTx(t) (26)
= Ax(t)− A1npiTx(0)− 1npiTx(t) + 1npiTAtx(0) (27)
= Ax(t)− A1npiTx(0)− 1npiTx(t) + 1npiTx(0) (28)
= Ax(t)− A1npiTx(0)− 1npiTx(t) + 1npiT1npiTx(0) (29)
= (A− 1npiT )(x(t)− 1npiTx(0)) (30)
= (A− 1npiT )e(t). (31)
(A, pi) is reversible, thus D1/2AD−1/2 is a symmetric matrix where D = diag(pi). Then, it is well-
known, e.g., see [6], that A has real eigenvalues and n distinct right eigenvectors v1, v2, · · · , vn
and n distinct left eigenvectors u1, u2, · · ·un such that ui = Dvi. So, it follows from orthogonality
of left and right eigenvectors that 〈vi, vj〉pi = δij , where δij = 1 if i = j and is zero otherwise.
Therefore, we have
(A− 1npiT )1n = 1n − 1n = 0
and, for i ≥ 2,
(A− 1npiT )vi = λivi − 1npiTvi = λivi,
Following standard line of arguments as in [6], e(t) =
∑n
i=1〈e(t), vi〉pivi. therefore,
(A− 1npiT )e(t) =
n∑
i=2
λi〈e(t), vi〉pivi.
and
‖e(t+ 1)‖2pi =
n∑
i=2
λ2i 〈e(t), vi〉2pi‖vi‖2pi
=
n∑
i=2
λ2i 〈e(t), vi〉2pi
≤ ρ22
n∑
i=2
〈e(t), vi〉2pi
= ρ22‖e(t)‖2pi,
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where ρ2 := maxi 6=1 |λi| is the SLEM of A. So ‖e(t + 1)‖pi ≤ ρ2‖e(t)‖pi, and, accordingly,
‖e(t)‖pi ≤ ρt2‖e(0)‖pi.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
The transition probability matrix of the random walk over Gˆ is given by
P =
 Aˆn×n Bˆn×|SP |
I|SP | 0
 . (32)
I|SP | is the identity matrix of size |SP |, i.e., when the walk reaches ui, it returns to its corre-
sponding stubborn agent i with probability 1. Nonzero elements of Aˆ correspond to transitions
between vertices of V . Nonzero elements of Bˆ correspond to transitions from a partially stubborn
agent i ∈ SP to ui. The matrices Aˆ and A only differ in the rows corresponding to agents SF
which are all-zero rows in A. Notice that xi(t) = xi(0) for all i ∈ SF and t ≥ 0. Hence, we can
focus on the dynamics of x˜(t) = [xi(t) : i ∈ V\SF ]T .
Let A˜ be the matrix obtained from Aˆ (or A) by removing rows and columns corresponding
to fully stubborn agents SF . Let AˆSF denote the columns of Aˆ corresponding to SF . Let B˜ be
the matrix obtained from B by (i) replacing the columns corresponding to fully stubborn agents
SF with AˆSF (or ASF ), (ii) removing rows corresponding to SF , (iii) removing the columns
corresponding to non-stubborn agents (which are all zero columns). Then, we have
x˜(t+ 1) = A˜x˜(t) + B˜xS(0).
where xS(0) = [xi(0) : i ∈ S]T . Note that both A and A˜ have the same largest eigenvalue, i.e.,
λA = λA˜. The dynamics converge to the equilibrium x˜(∞) = (I− A˜)−1B˜xS(0).
For each vertex i ∈ V , and j ∈ SF , let Fij := Pi(τ = τj) be the probability that random walk
hits j first, among vertices in SF ∪ u(SP ), given the random walk starts from vertex i. Also,
for each vertex i ∈ V , and uj ∈ u(SP ), let Fij := Pi(τ = τuj) be the probability that random
walk hits uj first, among vertices in SF ∪ u(SP ), given the random walk starts from vertex i.
Then, we have the following recursive formulas for the Fij probabilities. For every i ∈ V\SF
and every j ∈ SF ,
Fij = Aˆij +
∑
k∈V\SF
AˆikFkj, (33)
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and for every i ∈ V\SF and every j ∈ SP ,
Fij = Bˆij +
∑
k∈V\SF
AˆikFkj. (34)
Note that B˜ is [BˆAˆSF ] without the rows corresponding to SF . Hence, putting the two equations
together in the matrix form, F = B˜ + A˜F or F = (I− A˜)−1B˜.
Note that for any i ∈ SF , Fii = 1 and xi(t) = xi(0) at all times t ≥ 0. Hence, the equilibrium
at each node i ∈ V , is a convex combination of initial opinions of stubborn agents, where
xi(∞) =
∑
j∈S
Fijxj(0). (35)
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Recall graph Gˆ with edge weights {wij : (i, j) ∈ Eˆ}. By (2), and taking the limit as t→∞,
the equilibrium is the solution to the following set of linear equations
xi(∞) = 1
wi
∑
j∈∂i
wijxj(∞), (36)
for each node i ∈ Vˆ , with boundary conditions xui(∞) = xi(0), i ∈ SP , and xi(∞) = xi(0) for
i ∈ SF . Now assume each edge (i, j) ∈ Eˆ has a conductance wij and vertices SF ∪ u(SP ) are
voltage sources where the voltage of each source i ∈ SF is xi(0) volts and the voltage of each
source uj ∈ u(SP ), j ∈ SP , is xj(0) volts. Let vi be the voltage of node i. Kirchhoff’s current
law states that the total current entering each node must be zero, i.e., for each node i ∈ V\SF ,∑
j∈∂i wij(vi − vj) = 0 or equivalently,
wivi =
∑
j∈∂i
wijvj (37)
which, comparing to (36), shows that xi(∞) = vi. Note that having a fully stubborn agent i,
with Ki = ∞, corresponds with connecting i to a fixed voltage of xi(0) volts with an edge of
infinite conductance (short circuit). Hence, Ki’s can be interpreted as the internal conductance
of the voltage sources. A fully stubborn agent i with Ki = ∞ corresponds to an ideal voltage
source with zero internal resistance.
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From the definition of e(t),
e(t) = Atx(0) +
t−1∑
s=0
AsBx(0)−
∞∑
s=0
AsBx(0)
= Atx(0)−
∞∑
s=t
AsBx(0)
= At
(
x(0)−
∞∑
s=0
AsBx(0)
)
Hence e(t + 1) = Ae(t). Let λA denote the largest eigenvalue of the irreducible sub-stochastic
matrix A. Trivially ei(t) = 0 for all fully stubborn agents i ∈ SF . Let e˜(t) := (ei(t) : i ∈ V\SF )T
denote the vector of errors without the fully stubborn agents. Then e˜(t) = A˜e˜(t−1) holds, where
A˜ is the matrix obtained from A by removing rows and columns corresponding to agents SF .
Note that A˜ and A have the same largest eigenvalue, i.e., λA = λA˜.
Consider the Markov chain defined by P in (32). It is easy to check that P is reversible
with respect to a distribution pi = (pii = wiZ : i ∈ Vˆ)T where wi is the weighted degree of
vertex i, given by (12), and Z = 2(|E| + ∑i∈SP Ki) is the normalizing constant6. Note that
piiA˜ij = pijA˜ji holds for all i, j ∈ V\SF . By minor abuse of terminology, we would also call
A˜ reversible with respect to the distribution p˜i =
(
pii/pi(A˜) : i ∈ V\SF
)T
, where pi(A˜) is the
normalization constant. Let D˜ = diag(p˜i). Then, using the same trick as in the characterization
of eigenvalues of a reversible stochastic matrix, A∗ = D˜1/2A˜D˜−1/2 is symmetric and has the
same (real) eigenvalues as A˜. Moreover A∗ is diagonalizable with a set of equal right and left
eigenvectors θ1, · · · , θn−|SF |. Correspondingly, if u1, · · · , un−|SF | denote the left eigenvectors of
A˜ and v1, · · · , vn−|SF | denote its right eigenvectors, it should hold that ui = D˜vi. Also from the
orthogonality of θ′is, we have 〈ui, uj〉1/p˜i = δij and 〈vi, vj〉p˜i = δij . Using {v1, · · · , vn−|SF |} as a
base for Rn−|SF |, e˜(t) can be expressed as
e˜(t) =
n−|SF |∑
i=1
〈e˜(t), vi〉p˜ivi,
6By definition of reversibility, piiPij = pijPji for all i, j ∈ Vˆ
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so
A˜e˜(t) =
n∑
i=1
λi〈e˜(t), vi〉p˜ivi.
Therefore,
‖e˜(t+ 1)‖2p˜i =
n∑
i=1
λ2i 〈e˜(t), vi〉2p˜i‖vi‖2p˜i
=
n∑
i=1
λ2i 〈e˜(t), vi〉2p˜i
≤ λ2A
n∑
i=1
〈e˜(t), vi〉2p˜i
= λ2A‖e˜(t)‖2p˜i,
So ‖e˜(t+ 1)‖p˜i ≤ λA‖e˜(t)‖p˜i. Accordingly, ‖e˜(t)‖p˜i ≤ λtA‖e˜(0)‖p˜i.
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The three Lemmas are based on the extremal characterization of the eigenvalues. First, we
present an extremal characterization for the largest eigenvalue of a sub-stochastic (and reversible)
matrix. Then, we state the proofs of individual lemmas.
A and A˜ have the same largest eigenvalue (recall that A˜ is obtained from A by removing rows
and columns corresponding to fully stubborn agents SF , as in Appendix .). Consider the Markov
chain defined by P in (32). P is reversible with respect to pi = (pii = wiZ : i ∈ Vˆ)T where wi is
the weighted degree of vertex i, given by (12), and and Z = 2(|E|+∑i∈SP Ki) is the normalizing
constant. Note that piiA˜ij = pijA˜ji holds for all i, j ∈ V\SF . By minor abuse of terminology,
we would also call A˜ reversible with respect to the distribution p˜i =
(
pii/pi(A˜) : i ∈ V\SF
)T
,
where pi(A˜) is the normalization constant. Thus, it follows from extremal characterization of
eigenvalues [24], [6] that
1− λA = inf
f 6=0
〈(I− A˜)f, f〉p˜i
〈f, f〉p˜i
where the infimum is over all functions f : V\SF → R. The above characterization can also be
written as
1− λA = inf
g 6=0
〈(I− Aˆ)g, g〉pi
〈f, f〉pi
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where now the infimum is over all functions g : V → R with g(SF ) = 0. Recall the random
walk over the weighted graph Gˆ(Vˆ , Eˆ) with transition probability matrix P (32). Equivalently,
we can also write the characterization as
1− λA = inf
φ 6=0
〈(I− P )φ, φ〉pi
〈φ, φ〉pi .
where now the infimum is over functions φ : Vˆ → R, such that φ (SF ∪ u(SP )) = 0 7. Then,
〈(I− P )φ, φ〉pi = E(φ, φ) where E(φ, φ) is the Dirichlet form
E(φ, φ) = 1
2
∑
i,j∈Vˆ
piiPij(φ(i)− φ(j))2
which, in terms of the edge weights of Gˆ, is equal to
E(φ, φ) = 1
2w
∑
i,j∈Vˆ
wij(φ(i)− φ(j))2.
where w :=
∑
i∈Vˆ wi. Similarly,
〈φ, φ〉pi = 1
w
∑
i∈V\SF
wiφ
2(i).
Define a path from vertex i to vertex j, as a collection of oriented edges that connect i to j.
For any vertex i ∈ V\SF , consider a path γi from i to the set SF ∪u(SP ) that does not intersect
itself, i.e., γi = {(i, i1), (i1, i2), · · · , (im, j)} for some j ∈ SF ∪ u(SP ). Then, we can write
φ(i) =
∑
(x,y)∈γi(φ(x)− φ(y)).
Proof of Lemma 6: The result follows from the extremal characterization of 1− λA. Note
that
〈φ, φ〉pi = 1
w
∑
i∈V\SF
wi
 ∑
(x,y)∈γi
(φ(x)− φ(y))
2
=
1
w
∑
i∈V\SF
wi
 ∑
(x,y)∈γi
1√
wxy
√
wxy(φ(x)− φ(y))
2
≤ 1
w
∑
i∈V\SF
wi
 ∑
(x,y)∈γi
1
wxy
 ∑
(x,y)∈γi
wxy(φ(x)− φ(y))2
 (38)
7It is worth pointing out that function f , accordingly g or φ, that achieves the infimum is the right eigenvector corresponding
to λA and from Peron-Ferobenius theorem, it must be nonnegative.
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=
1
w
∑
i∈V\SF
wi|γi|w
 ∑
(x,y)∈γi
wxy(φ(x)− φ(y))2

=
1
w
∑
x,y∈Vˆ
wxy(φ(x)− φ(y))2
 ∑
i:γi3(x,y)
wi|γi|w

≤ 2E(φ, φ)ξ (39)
This concludes the proof. Inequality (38) is an application of Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Proof of Lemma 7: The proof is again based on the extremal characterization. Note that
〈φ, φ〉pi = 1
w
∑
i∈V\SF
wi
 ∑
(x,y)∈γi
(φ(x)− φ(y))
2
≤ 1
w
∑
i∈V\SF
wi|γi|
∑
(x,y)∈γi
(φ(x)− φ(y))2 (40)
=
1
w
∑
x,y∈Vˆ
(φ(x)− φ(y))2
∑
i:γi3(x,y)
wi|γi|
=
1
w
∑
x,y∈Vˆ
wxy(φ(x)− φ(y))2 1
wxy
∑
i:γi3(x,y)
wi|γi|
≤ 2E(φ, φ)η. (41)
which concludes the proof. Inequality (40) follows from Cauchy-Schwarz inequality.
Proof of Lemma 8: To find an upper bound on 1− λA, consider indicator functions of the
form 1B(i), B ⊆ V\SF , in the extremal characterization of eigenvalues. Then, we have
1− λA ≤ E(1B,1B)〈1B,1B〉pi
=
∑
i∈B,j /∈B wij∑
i∈B wi
=: ψ(B; Gˆ)
And accordingly, 1 − λA ≤ minB⊆V\SF ψ(B; Gˆ). It is easy to see that the minimizing B is the
vertex set of a connected subgraph of G\SF in the above minimization.
33
APPENDIX F
PROOF OF LEMMA 9
First, we show that the mean degree is less than a constant for all n for all α ≥ 0.
∑
k 6=i
‖i− k‖−α ≥
√
n/2∑
l=1
(l)l−α ≥
∫ √n/2
1
x1−αdx =
1
2− α((
√
n/2)2−α − 1)
≥ (
√
n/2)2−α
2− α , for α 6= 2,
and log(
√
n/2) for α = 2. For any node u, du ≤ 4 + q +
∑n
i=1,i 6=u
∑q
s=1 Xis, where Xis is
a Bernoulli random variable indicating if the s-th shortcut, 1 ≤ s ≤ q, from i is connected
to u or not. Hence du is the summation of (n − 1)q independent random variables which are
not necessarily identically distributed except those random variables that correspond to shortcuts
from the same node. Let d¯u := E
[
du
]
. Hence
d¯u ≤ 4 + q + q
2
√
n∑
l=1
(4l)l−α
2− α
(
√
n/2)2−α
≤ 4 + q + q 2− α
(
√
n/2)2−α
(
1 +
∫ 2√n+1
1
x1−αdx
)
= 4 + q + q
2− α
(
√
n/2)2−α
(
1 +
1
2− α(2
√
n+ 1)2−α − 1)
)
≤ 4 + q + 2q62−α ≤ 77q
and for α = 2,
d¯u ≤ 4 + q + q 1
log(
√
n/2)
(
1 +
∫ 2√n+1
1
x−1dx
)
= 4 + q + q
1
log(
√
n/2)
(
1 + log(2
√
n+ 1)
)
≤ 4 + q + 4q ≤ 9q
Next, we use the following version of the checkoff bound for summation of independent, but
not identically distributed, Bernoulli random variables (Lemma 2.4 of [28]),
P
(
du − d¯u ≥ d¯u
) ≤ exp(−h()d¯u)
where h(x) := (1 + x) log(1 + x)− x. Let  = logn
d¯u
, then h() ≥ logn
d¯u
(log logn
d¯u
− 1), thus,
P
(
du − d¯u ≥ d¯u
) ≤ n1−log lognd¯u ≤ n1−log logn77q = n1+log(77q)−log logn.
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By the union bound
P
(∃u : du − d¯u ≥ d¯u) ≤ n2+log(77q)−log logn.
so, as n→∞, dmax = O(log n) with high probability.
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